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THE STATE OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Theodore R. Newman, Jr. *
In 1977 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals celebrated its thirty-
fifth birthday, having been created as the Municipal Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia by Act of Congress of April 1, 1942.1 Last year
also marked the sixth year that the court has served as the court of last
resort in the District of Columbia court system, pursuant to the District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.2 Thus,
while one could consider the court to be in the prime of its institutional
adulthood, it is simultaneously in its childhood/in terms of the functions
it is now called upon to perform. In order to properly understand the
scope of the problems facing the court and to evaluate the steps being
taken to deal with them, it is crucial that we examine the court since its
inception. The focus of analysis must not merely be on the increase in
the number of cases filed. Rather, it must also account for the changes in
the substantive nature of the issues which the court has been called upon
to address, changes which have been brought about primarily by virtue
of wide-ranging alterations in the jurisdictional structure of the District
of Columbia's court system.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COURT
Before the Municipal Court of Appeals was created in 1942, the
judicial power in the District was vested in "First. Inferior courts,
namely, justices of the peace and the police court; and Second. Superior
courts, namely, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the court
of appeals of the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court of the
* Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. While accepting full
responsibility for the views expressed herein, he is pleased to acknowledge the able
assistance of Steven Tabackman, Esquire, a former law clerk, in its preparation.
1. Act of April 1, 1942, ch. 207, § 6, 56 Stat. 194 [hereinafter cited as Act of 1942].
2. D.C. Code §§ 11-101 to 11-2504, 23-101 to 23-1705 (1973).
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United States. 3 The Municipal Court of Appeals was established as "an
intermediate appellate court . . . for the hearing of appeals from judg-
ments and orders of The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia
• . ."4 Because of the severely limited jurisdiction of the trial courts5
over whose judgments and orders the court was to exercise review, 6 the
volume of cases was relatively low and the scope of issues presented
proportionately narrow.
7
The Act creating both the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia
and the Municipal Court of Appeals did not alter the status of the United
States Court of Appeals as a court of the District of Columbia for
purposes of appellate review. Review by the circuit court was limited to
judgments of the municipal court of appeals and was discretionary in
nature. 8 Also, because it also was a court statutorily vested with the
"judicial power in the District," the Supreme Court of the United States
3. Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 231 Stat. 1190 (current version at D.C. Code § 11-
101 (1973)). The Act of Congress which created the Municipal Court of Appeals, see note
1 supra, also effectuated the consolidation of the Police Court and the Municipal Court
into the "Municipal Court for the District of Columbia."
4. See Act of 1942, supra note 1.
5. The Act creating the new Municipal Court expanded the jurisdiction previously
exercised by the article I trial courts only on the civil side. This expansion was effec-
tuated by raising the jurisdictional limit on the amount in controversy in suits for damages
from $1,000 to $3,000. On the criminal side, jurisdiction in the new court was identical to
that previously exercised by the Police Court: essentially concurrent jurisdiction with the
United States district court over misdemeanors and offenses against municipal ordinances
and regulations. Act of 1942, ch. 207, § 4, 56 Stat. 192.
6. Appeal from the Municipal Court or from the separate Juvenile Court was of right,
with the exception of judgments of the small claims and conciliation branch and judg-
ments of the criminal branch when the penalty imposed was less than $50, in which cases
review was by "application for the allowance of an appeal." Act of 1942, ch. 207, § 7(a),
56 Stat. 195.
7. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943, 139 cases were commenced and 115 were
terminated. Of the 60 appeals taken from the civil branch of the Municipal Court, nearly
two-thirds involved claims of less than $500 (not including appeals by application from the
small claims branch). MUNICIPAL COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING June 30, 1943 at 1. A significant number of
appeals involved issues such as the admissibility of evidence, whether judgments of the
trial court were adequately supported by the evidence, and whether jury instructions
accurately reflected the law. See, e.g., American Heating Eng'r Co. v. Kennedy-Cham-
berlin Dev. Co., 31 A.2d 654 (D.C. 1943); Fliss v. Reliable Constr. & Realty Co., 31 A.2d
655 (D.C. 1943); Brooks v. District of Columbia, 31 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1943); Waterman v.
Railway Express Agency, 31 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1943); Raaen v. Southern Hotel Supply Co.,
31 A.2d 659 (D.C. 1942); Smith & Gottlieb, Inc. v. Cheatham, 31 A.2d 676 (D.C. 1942);
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 31 A.2d 680 (D.C. 1942). Additionally, on the civil
side, the substantive issues before the court generally involved well-settled issues of
contract, tort, and negotiable instruments law. On the criminal docket, jurisdiction was
limited to review of misdemeanor convictions.
8. See Act of 1942, supra note 1, at ch. 207, § 8, 56 Stat. 196.
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possessed jurisdiction to review judgments of the United States Court of
Appeals not otherwise reviewable in its appellate jurisdiction, although
as a matter of practice, it would abstain from exercising its jurisdictional
prerogatives in matters involving purely local law. 9 However, the circuit
court fully exercised its authority as the highest court of the jurisdiction.
In short, the circuit court, sitting as the court of last resort in the District
of Columbia, utilized its appellate authority in a manner that students of
appellate court function have referred to as "institutional review."
10
Thus, the Municipal Court of Appeals exercised its appellate jurisdiction
towards the fulfillment of the second function of appellate courts: "error
review."" To fulfill this limited function, the Municipal Court of Ap-
peals as originally constituted consisted of a Chief Judge and two As-
sociate Judges, each serving fixed terms.
From all appearances, this complement of judges was sufficient to
handle the work of the court. This is demonstrated by the fact that
between June 30, 1942 and June 30, 1945, of the 408 cases commenced,
387 cases were terminated, only ten of which were disposed of by the
parties.' 2 A decade later the caseload of the three-member court was
approximately the same and the rate of dispositions did not drop notice-
ably. 13 However, by 1967 the caseload had increased to 312 filings
annually. 14 Moreover, the criminal docket comprised over 50% of the
calendar, 15 thus increasing the need for celerity in dispositions and mak-
9. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958); Griffin v. United States,
336 U.S. 704, 715 (1949); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946).
10. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 1-2 (1940); P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976). Cf. ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 &
note at 4 (App. Draft 1977) [hereinafter APPELLATE COURTS].
11. See note 10 supra. For an interesting and elucidative examination of the role of
intermediate appellate courts see Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court,
41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459 (1975). See also cases cited note 7 supra.
12. See MUNICIPAL COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, STATISTICAL
REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 1943, 1944 & 1945. Moreover, nearly 70% of
the cases disposed of by the court were the subject of published opinions.
13. See MUNICIPAL COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, STATISTICAL
REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 1955 & 1956. It is significant that in none of
the five years discussed in this and the preceding note did criminal appeals comprise more
than 15% of the court's docket. This stands in stark contrast to the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1977, in which criminal appeals comprised over 50% of the filings. DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEP-
TEMBER 30, 1977.
14. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1967.
15. Id.
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ing the court's steadily increasing backlog more ominous. 6 In response,
Congress enlarged the size of the court to six judges.
17
Fiscal year 1971 marked the last full year that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals shared appellate jurisdiction over "local" matters with
the United States Court of Appeals. In that year, case filings numbered
548, and while over 90% of the cases presented to the court were
disposed of, the court was left with a 20% increase in its pending
unresolved caseload at the end of the year.'
8
It would be supererogatory to engage in a detailed analysis of the
effect of the Court Reorganization Act on the jurisdiction of the various
District of Columbia courts. 19 It is, however, necessary to highlight
several aspects in which the reorganization had impact on the operation
of the court. By creating a trial court of general jurisdiction over all
criminal and civil matters arising in the District, the reorganization signif-
icantly broadened the scope of the issues which could be raised at trial
and, consequently, on appeal. 2° No longer would "big" local cases be
tried in the district court and reviewed by the United States Court of
Appeals, and no longer would those courts be "the big courts" of the
District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals became
the court of last resort in the District of Columbia. 21 Notwithstanding this
most significant change in the status of the court, appeal of right re-
mained in virtually all cases. 22 Thus, the court was called upon to exer-
cise both of the previously identified functions of appellate courts, i.e.,
16. See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 56-
61. Cf. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
CRIMINAL APPEALS § 3.4 & note at 91-92 (App. Draft. 1970); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM.
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, ch. 6, at 112-15 (1973) [hereinafter
NAC].
17. Act of Dec. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-178, § 1(I), 81 Stat. 544. In part, the increase in
filings was brought about by a change in the trial court jurisdiction. By Act of Oct. 23,
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-873, § 2, 76 Stat. 1171, Congress changed the name of the Municipal
Court to the "District of Columbia Court of General Sessions," and expanded its civil
jurisdiction to include cases in which the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000.
Additionally, Congress had, by Act of Apr. 11, 1956, ch. 204, § 101, 70 Stat. 111,
transferred jurisdiction over domestic relations cases from the United States district court
to a newly-created Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court. See id. § 105, 70
Stat. 112.
18. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1971.
19. See Mr. Justice White's concise summary in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 392 n.2 (1973).
20. See D.C. Code §§ 11-901, 921 (1973).
21. See D.C. Code § 11-721 (1973).
22. See D.C. Code §§ l 1-721(b)-(c) (1973). The exceptions to this procedure are limited
to judgments of the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch and those judgments of the
Criminal Division in which the penalty imposed was less than $50. Id.
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error review and institutional review, 23 while simultaneously moving
from its position as a low-volume intermediate appellate court to a non-
discretionary, high-volume court of last resort. Finally, the court was
given jurisdiction to review orders and decisions of the mayor and city
council as well as "any agency of the District of Columbia." 24
The combined effect of these expanded jurisdictional provisions was
more than a doubling in the number of appellate filings in calendar 1976
as compared to calendar 1971 .25 Moreover, by the end of calendar 1976
the court was faced with a pending docket nearly equal in size to the
number of cases disposed of during that year.
26
The effect on the court's caseload, both in numbers and complexity,
represents the most far-reaching consequence of the revised juris-
dictional structure. However, court reorganization has also created is-
sues regarding the relationship of this court to the federal courts within
the District, as well as to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover,
because it is a court of last resort, the court must face questions relating
to its supervisory authority over the Superior Court. 27 Given the
comparative significance of the caseload expansion, however, it is ap-
propriate to examine first in some detail the techniques and procedures
which the court has considered and begun to implement to meet the
demands upon it.
II. NEW TECHNIQUES TO INCREASE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY
Though the enormous increases in appellate dockets take on different
dimensions in this jurisdiction because of the unique historical devel-
opment of the "local" court system, such increases are, of course, a
nationwide phenomenon. 28 As a result, students of the judicial process
have begun to devote increased attention to the function of appellate
tribunals, focusing primarily on the manner by which increased efficien-
cy can be obtained without sacrificing "the imperatives of appellate
23. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
24. See D.C. Code § 11-722 (Supp. IV 1977).
25. A detailed analysis of this increase is presented in REPORT ON THE WORKLOAD OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS: CALENDAR YEAR 1976 AS COMPARED TO
FIVE PRECEDING YEARS (1977) [hereinafter REPORT ON WORKLOAD].
26. Id. at 5. As a gauge of the workload that the court faces, it should be noted that the
court has by far the largest caseload when compared to appellate courts of the same size
(nine members) and when compared to appellate courts which serve in jurisdictions of
comparable population (800,000). Id. at 7. See also W. KRAMER, OUTLINE OF BASIC
APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES (1975).
27. These issues are briefly explored in Part III, infra.
28. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 4-5, nn.
5-15.
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justice."2 9 The problem would be difficult enough were it only to involve
devising techniques whereby a court could handle an increased number
of cases of uniform difficulty and indistinguishable significance. Such a
picture does not, however, accurately represent the present circum-
stance. Appellate court caseloads generally, and this court's in particu-
lar, have become more diverse in composition as well as larger.3 0 This
adds to the complexity of the management problem. An American Bar
Association study has formulated this administrative problem in the
following manner:
This variety in caseloads means that appellate courts must em-
ploy procedures and methods of administration that permit them
to give sufficient attention to complex cases and at the same
time to eliminate undue expenditure of effort on less difficult
matters, while avoiding peremptoriness or its appearance and
thus subverting the very purpose of appellate review. These
complex requirements mean that appellate courts must exercise
positive control and supervision of their caseflow to an extent
far beyond that to which they have been traditionally accus-
tomed. 3'
In an attempt to meet these requirements, this court has implemented
processes which seek both to increase present administrative efficiency
(i.e., doing better that which we are already doing), as well as to develop
long-term plans for meeting the inevitable future increases in caseload
volume and diversity. In this regard, five strategies have been devel-
oped: (a) increased utilization and expansion of the court's central staff
of "court law clerks" aiming at two areas: reduction of both the motions
backlog and the number of cases which are placed on the court's "regu-
lar" as opposed to its "summary" calendar; (b) increased utilization of
memorandum judgment orders and a consequent decrease in published
opinions; (c) use of pre-argument conferences between the court and the
parties, referred to as "settlement" conferences for shorthand purposes;
(d) use of pre-argument conferences among the members of the court
who will hear the argument; and (e) establishment of internal operating
rules. These shall be discussed in turn.
A. Increased Use of Court Law Clerks:
Motions and Summary Calendar
The call for greater reliance upon a centralized legal staff is wide-
29. Id. at 7-12. The authors divide their list between "process imperatives" and
"systemic imperatives."
30. See APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at 1.
31. Id. at 1-2.
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spread today.32 In large part, this is based upon the perception, support-
ed by the relatively limited data available, that there exists a utilitarian
limit to the size of a judge's personal research staff,3 3 particularly with
regard to a judge's ability to adequately supervise and administer his law
clerks. Such a central staff utilization is particularly critical in a court
such as ours which undertakes to perform both the error review function
and the law development function. As Professors Carrington, Meador,
and Rosenberg have phrased it:
The crucial step in the effective utilization of central staff is to
alter the traditional appellate procedure which operates in all
cases the same, in favor of a differentiated procedure which
measures the court's efforts to fit the needs of the particular
case. It is in the operation of a differentiated procedure that the
central staff can be used to substantial advantage.
34
One of the functions presently carried out by the court law clerks,
who, working under the supervision of the Clerk of the Court, constitute
the court's "central legal staff," is the preliminary screening of cases
which are fully briefed. The purpose is to submit recommendations to
the Clerk of the Court (who is an attorney) and the Chief Judge for
calendaring.3 Of 615 cases set for merits determination during calendar
1976, 239, or approximately 40%, were set on the summary calendar.
These are generally one or two issue cases which are susceptible of
disposition without oral argument and without published opinion. Final
disposition is by a three-judge panel, as is the situation with cases placed
upon the "regular" calendar, and each judge's review of the merits is
undertaken with the research assistance of the judge's law clerks. Data
from other jurisdictions demonstrates that this procedure results in a
32. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 47; D.
MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME passim
(1974); Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution To An Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 465 (1976). For a detailed description of a highly developed central staff, see
Lesinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in the Michigan Court of
Appeals: One Court's Method For Increasing Judicial Productivity, 26 VAND. L. REV.
1211 (1973).
33. See Cameron, supra note 32, and sources cited therein at 467-68 n.8; P. CARRING-
TON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 44-46.
34. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 47. Within the
next six months, the court anticipates the installation of a mini-computer. It is anticipated
that use of this technology will assist in a more efficient caseflow management program.
35. Since November, 1974, the court has divided its calendar into a "regular" calendar
and a "summary" calendar. Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg have suggested that this
"calendaring" function, to which they apply the term "routing preview," can be perform-
ed by the "staff director," a person who is functionally equivalent to the Clerk of the
Court. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 49.
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significant time-savings. 36 Our experience tends to confirm this data.
However, budgetary limitations may well cause the court to limit its
employment of court law clerks in the future, with the attendant loss of
productive capacity. If the court is to continue its efforts at differentia-
ting between those cases which necessitate consideration under the more
traditional appellate procedure and those which are susceptible to a
foreshortened mode of review without a diminution in "appellate jus-
tice," increased resources must be devoted to enlarge the central legal
staff.
37
The second function of the court law clerk is the screening of motions
and preparing written analyses thereof. On November 1, 1976, an unre-
solved motions backlog totalling approximately eighty existed. By as-
signing one of the court law clerks full time to motions, the backlog was
reduced to approximately twenty-five by February 1, 1977.38 While it
would be desirable to continue in this fashion, the budgetary constraints
36. D. MEADOR, supra note 32, at 14-28 (Supp. 1975).
37. It is appropriate, at this point, to address briefly the concerns of those persons who
fear that summary process means summary justice. The literature belies any such conten-
tion. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 32, at 475; Christian, Using Prehearing Procedures to
Increase Productivity, 52 F.R.D. 55, 60 (1971); Flanders & Goldman, Screening Practices
and the Use of Para-Judicial Personnel in a U.S. Court of Appeals: A Study in the Fourth
Circuit, I Jus. Sys. J. 1-16 (1975). As Professor Meador has noted, the use of such
screening procedures demonstrates the
"functional blurring" between "appeals of right" (the system under which our
court operates) and "discretionary review," thus serving "to legitimate ab-
breviated appellate processes, [and] thereby loosening the decisional strait-jacket
in which many appellate courts think themselves bound because their jurisdiction
is cast in terms of "appeals of right." That is, because of the introduction of
screening and differentiated process, it can now be recognized that an "appeal of
right" does not include a right to any fixed procedure .... What a litigant
should get at the first level of review-whether his avenue of review be labeled as
one of right or one in the court's discretion-is a procedure which preserves the
essential elements of an appeal . . . .The procedure should preserve the es-
sence, but it need not preserve all the familiar trappings..... How the conten-
tions are communicated is not of the essence; whether in writing or orally is a
detail of means on which there is surely room for choice by the court. How the
court goes about considering and deciding the case is likewise a matter which
does not go to the essence, so long as the judges give a meaningful consideration
to the merits of the appellant's contentions.
D. MEADOR, supra note 32, at 170. But cf. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG,
supra note 10, at 16-24 (oral argument ought be permitted whenever sought by a party, but
parties ought to be invited to waive argument when the court deems it appropriate).
Compare APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.35 & note at 56-7 (eliminating oral
argument viewed as an "extreme measure" but remaining under court control; parties
allowed to submit written statements in support of oral argument when advised that court
intends none).
38. See T. NEWMAN, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA (1977).
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previously adverted to cast some doubt upon our ability to do so. Such a
loss would be highly regrettable.
B. Increased Use of Memorandum Opinions
The proposition that the writing and review of opinions occupies the
largest portion of an appellate judge's time hardly needs substantiation.
39
When a court's caseload is manageable and totally current, it is not
surprising that the bulk of its merits dispositions would be by published
opinions. In this regard, one may again note that in the years immediately
following the creation of the Municipal Court of Appeals, over 70% of its
decided cases were by published opinion.
By contrast, in fiscal 1977, of 746 cases terminated by merits adjudica-
tion by the court, published opinions were issued in 275 cases, or 37%. In
the remainder, termination was by "Memorandum Opinion and Judg-
ment Order." It is crucial to understand what is contained in such a
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Order. Generally, these are merely
substantially condensed versions of what would be contained in a pub-
lished opinion: (a) statement of proceedings below and issues raised on
appeal; (b) recitation of relevant facts; (c) analysis of relevant law; and
(d) application of law to facts leading to result. 40 The use of unpublished
opinions as a dispositional technique has wide support among the
commentators on the appellate decisional process. The National Adviso-
ry Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has suggested
that only 20% of all criminal appeals should be terminated by published
opinion. 41 Other commentators and groups have recognized the validity
of this technique in the area of civil, agency, and other types of ap-
peals. 42 When caution is taken to insure that unpublished opinions do not
become a vehicle by which a court may fail to consider adequately the
merits of each case presented, their value is, to my mind, unquestion-
able. The court, in its attempt to insure proper use of unpublished
opinions, has incorporated into its internal operating procedures both
written standards for the use of unpublished opinions and procedures by
39. But see R. ALDISERT, THIRD CIRCUIT TIME STUDY (1973).
40. An examination of the published opinions by the court during its early history and
comparison of them with present-day Memorandum Opinions and Judgment Orders will
disclose a great similarity between the two. Given the limit of the court's function to
"error review" prior to court reorganization, this is understandable.
41. See NAC, supra note 16, at § 6.9. Note that in 1976, 51% of criminal appeals
disposed of on the merits were by published opinion. See T. NEWMAN, supra note 38, at
app.
42. See APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.37; Joiner, Limiting Publication of
Judicial Opinions, 56 JUD. 195 (1972). P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG,
supra note 10, at 31-43; R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS, ch. 13 (1974); B.
WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS §§ 16-22 & 131-142 (1977).
1978]
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which the bar may seek to have the court publish an unpublished opin-
ion. Further, to evaluate the experience of the court in complying with
these standards, I will recommend to the court that upon the conclusion
of one year of operation under the new standards (which became effec-
tive January 1, 1978), an evaluation be made by some entity such as the
Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Colum-
bia, and that this evaluation be made public.
43
It is clear that if the court is to prevent a further increase in the one-
year backlog presently existing, a greater use of unpublished opinions
must be made in the performance of the court's "error review" function.
C. Pre-argument Conferences Between
the Court and Parties
In recent years, various appellate courts have begun to experiment
with pre-argument "settlement" conferences. As is reflected in a recent
article in the American Bar Association Journal, 44 such conferences have
been utilized with varying degrees of success in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, several Appellate Divisions of the
Supreme Court of New York, and the Third District Court of Appeals in
California.
Chief Judge Kaufman has had occasion to write regarding the Second
Circuit's program, 45 known as the "Civil Action Management Program,"
or CAMP, which constituted the first implementation of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33.46 As such, it has as its objectives "to encourage
parties in civil cases to reach voluntary settlement early in the appellate
process and to simplify the issues and otherwise streamline unsettled
cases for adjudication." ' 47 Although the results of the Second Circuit
plan appear to be marginal, 48 reports on the use by other courts of this
43. Similar studies have disclosed little abuse of this method of case disposition. See,
e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT ON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS 15-16 (1976), reported in Mueller, Unpublished Opinion
Study, I ST. COURT J. 23 (Summer 1977); Frank, Remarks before the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference, 16 JUDGES' J. 10 (Winter 1977).
44. See Benjamin & Morris, The Appellate Settlement Conference: A Procedure Whose
Time Has Come, 62 A.B.A.J. 1433 (1976).
45. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974).
46. That rule provides for a pre-hearing conference, analogous to the usual pre-trial
conference authorized by Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 16. It is aimed at the
simplification of issues to be addressed at oral argument.
47. See Kaufman, supra note 45, at 1094.
48. In his article reviewing the early results of CAMP, Chief Judge Kaufman claimed a
remarkably high degree of success in achieving termination of cases without argument as
[Vol. 27:453
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technique are encouraging.
While recognizing that pre-argument conferences are not the panacea
for the problem of scarce appellate resources, 49 it appeared that such a
program might prove sufficiently useful in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals to warrant exploration. Consequently, the court re-
quested and obtained funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration to conduct a seminar at which the judges of this court,
selected judges from the Superior Court, and members of the Bar could
consider the adoption of such procedures. Last April the seminar was
conducted, and the procedures have been utilized in two cases. In one,
Washington Hospital Center v. Moore,50 a highly complex medical mal-
practice case wherein a $2.5 million verdict had been returned, a settle-
ment was reached after briefing for $1.5 million.51 In a second, Adams v.
District of Columbia ,52 a personal injury case arising from a stabbing at
the District of Columbia Jail, a $598,000 verdict was compromised prior
to briefing for $225,000. Moreover, because the conference in the former
case was conducted by a judge of the trial court, and in the latter by a
retired judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, there was
virtually no expenditure of the scarce resource of actively sitting appeals
judges' time.53 My predecessor, Chief Judge Gerard Reilly, although
retired, has graciously agreed to continue to serve the bench and bar of
compared to "un-CAMPed" cases. Id. at 1098 & n. 16. However, a more recent indepen-
dent evaluation taken under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center indicates that the
program has not been as successful as its advocates claim, effecting only a marginal
acceleration in the disposition of civil appeals. GOLDMAN, AN EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL
APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977).
49. See Mack, Settlement Procedures on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Proposal, I
JUST. SYS. J. 17 (1975).
50. Civ. No. 11266 (D.C., dismissed, May 20, 1977).
51. Holding the conference after substantial briefing is not the preferable mode of
procedure. As Mack has cogently argued:
One of the two major monetary incentives to settlement in the model is the
avoidance of the higher transaction costs of appeal. The appellate brief is prob-
ably the single major expense of both lawyers' time and clients' money in an
appeal. The table above [showing percentage of Third Circuit settlements in FY
1972] shows that fully 85% of litigants who seek to settle do so before the
significant costs of brief writing are incurred.
Mack, supra note 49, at 31. The results in Washington Hospital Center demonstrate,
however, that settlement can be reached even when timing is less than optimal, and
therefore that the timing factor ought not control whether a pre-argument conference is
pursued.
52. Civ. No. 12098 (D.C. 1977).
53. In the Second Circuit, pre-argument conferences are conducted by staff counsel.
In virtually all other jurisdictions, however, active or retired judges are utilized. This
appears to be the preferred approach.
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the District of Columbia by undertaking the role of pre-argument settle-
ment judge on a continuing basis.
In concluding, I should strongly emphasize that the effectuation of a
settlement does not constitute the sole measuring rod as to the effective-
ness of the pre-argument conference procedure. As Chief Judge Kauf-
man points out:
Even where pre-argument conferences did not lead to settle-
ment or withdrawal of the appeal, significant benefits accrued.
In 18 cases the conference resulted in substantial simplification
of the appeal. Numerous substantive motions were eliminated
by stipulation, issues were clarified or dropped, and projected
appendices were reduced in size. Agreements reached at the
conferences concerning such matters were memorialized in pre-
argument orders, which control the future course of the appeals.
The aggregate saving of judicial resources occasioned by fewer
motions and sharply defined appeals, although not easily quan-
tified, is substantial (citations omitted).
54
D. Pre-argument Panel Conferences
A related, but procedurally and functionally distinguishable innovation
of the court is the use of conferences, prior to argument, among the
members of the panel designated to hear the scheduled cases. 55 The aim
is to identify those issues which appear most decisive or troublesome to
the panel members, so that counsel can be informed as to which ques-
tions to address in oral argument. Moreover, the conferences help pre-
pare the panel members more thoroughly for the argument. It is unneces-
sary to dwell on the benefits expected to accrue from this procedure. If
oral argument is to be meaningful to the ultimate disposition of a case, it
follows inexorably that steps which serve to prepare all the participants
better and to focus the substantive discussion more adequately ought to
be fostered at every turn.
E. Internal Operating Rules
The need for internal operating procedural rules for an appellate court
has been frequently recognized. 56 As pointed out, "the essential func-
54. Kaufman, supra note 45, at 1101; see APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.53
& note at 89-90. In Christian v. United States, appeal docketed, Civ. No. 8809 (D.C.
1974), a pre-briefing conference between the court and counsel was used effectively by
this court to accomplish these types of goals.
55. See APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.34(b).
56. See, e.g., APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.40 & Commentary at 69. See
also id. § 3.30, Commentary at 46-47.
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tions of an appellate court are. . . beyond the reach of effective outside
scrutiny." 57 Because of the need for confidentiality in the court's deci-
sional processes, as well as for official autonomy, effective supervision
of the court's duties must come from within. 58 In recognition of such
responsibility, internal rules were formulated and published by the court.
They became effective on January 1, 1978. The rules are an attempt to
deal forthrightly with the entire range of issues that face the court,
including the establishment of guidelines for calendaring of cases,
guidelines for the use of memorandum judgment orders and opinions,
rules regarding petitions for hearings and rehearings en banc, and a
schedule for the post-argument disposition of cases. It is hoped that
these procedures and their publication will both facilitate the orderly
conduct of court business and help to upgrade the level of the court's
public accountability.
Having emphasized the steps taken thus far to make the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals a more efficiently operated system, I should
strongly emphasize that while efficiency in operation and some degree of
celerity in dispositions is essential if justice is not to be deferred by
protracted litigation, efficiency is not the benchmark against which the
functioning of this court ought to be measured. Indeed, as Mr. Justice
Stewart has so cogently remarked:
In our contemporary infatuation with statistics and with record-
keeping, I am convinced that there is too often a temptation to
measure the efficiency and character of a court entirely in terms
of how many cases that court disposes of each year. Statistics
are all very well, and it is all very well to import into the practice
and procedure of the courts whatever techniques of modern
business administration may be adaptable. But judicial deci-
sions are not articles of commerce, and courts are not Detroit
assembly lines. The quality and character of justice are much
too elusive and much too important to be measured entirely in
terms of how many. Long ago Chief Justice Hughes warned of
indulging the passion for expedition at the risk of thorough and
deliberate consideration of cases. 59
III. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SUPERIOR COURT
Having focused thus far exclusively on issues internal to the court, I
shall now shift that focus to another major area of concern with which
the court must deal: its relationship to the Superior Court. My goal is not
57. Id. at 47.
58. Id.
59. R. LEFLAR, supra note 42, at 252.
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to engage in a detailed exposition on the nature of the interaction be-
tween a court of last resort and the trial bench over which it exercises
review, 6° but rather to adumbrate two particular problems which the
court must address: review of the exercise of trial court discretion and
the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, especially in the area of law
enforcement.
A. Trial Court Discretion
One need not have long studied the trial court process to realize that
the vast majority of decisions made at that level involve the exercise of
trial court discretion. This is particularly true of rules governing pre-trial
procedure and admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial
itself. There is generally no replacement for trial judge discretion. Were
an appellate body to attempt a detailed review of the various considera-
tions of which the trial judge must be cognizant in administering the
conduct of litigation, finality in judgments-surely a goal to be fos-
tered-would be seriously jeopardized. Moreover, it is doubtful that an
appellate tribunal could properly take into account all the multi-various
factors, even were this a desirable goal. Thus, the primary protection
against abuse of the trial process by the judiciary resides in a high quality
and conscientious trial bench.
Nonetheless, appellate courts have a responsibility to monitor the
exercise of discretion by the trial judge. It is one thing to affirm a
judgment on the ground that the challenged ruling resides in "the sound
discretion of the trial court" to which the reviewing court ought to defer;
it is quite another to totally abdicate the responsibility to review discre-
tionary decisions. Appellate review of trial court discretionary determi-
nations ought to be undertaken with a view toward developing standards
and procedures aimed at securing greater uniformity of result. An appel-
late court must be careful to guard against the twin faults of considering
only whether it would have exercised discretion in the same way that the
trial court chose, or merely announcing "in conclusory terms whether or
not there was an abuse of discretion in particular circumstances."
61
Because of its ultimate authority to establish the governing law within its
60. One of the issues thus not addressed is the severe limitation placed upon the court
performing the traditional and proper role of a jurisdiction's highest court in supervising
the administration of a court system. See ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION [hereinafter cited as
COURT ORGANIZATION] §§ 1. 11, 1. 12(d), 1.30, 1.33 (giving the structure and composition of
the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration, the body charged with supervising the
administration of the District of Columbia court system); D.C. Code § 11-1701 (1973).
61. APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 10, at § 3.11 & Commentary at 24.
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jurisdiction, and the concomitant responsibility to ensure that the law is
applied, insofar as humanly possible, with uniformity and evenhanded-
ness, the appellate court must undertake to guide the trial court "by
specifying the factors that it considers important and the range of choice
within which the trial judge may properly act." '62 Only when it has
engaged in this exercise can an appellate court of last resort be said to
have fulfilled its functions in this highly critical area.
63
B. The Exercise of Supervisory Power
The question of the scope of this court's "supervisory power" is one
which presently faces us.64 Because of the unique historical development
of the court, and its unique status with regard to its relationship to its
federal counterparts, as well as to the Supreme Court, the problem takes
on an added dimension. Given the fact that collateral attacks on criminal
convictions in the Superior Court may not be presented to the federal
courts in this jurisdiction, 65 and because the Supreme Court has no
appellate (non-discretionary) jurisdiction over judgments of this court,
66
the authority of this court, and attendant responsibility, is at least as
extensive as that of the highest court of a state judicial system.
The supervisory power of the Supreme Court over the lower federal
courts has been expressly recognized. 67 The Supreme Court has likewise
acknowledged the role of highest state appellate courts in the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking of state courts,
recently took occasion to note that an "appellate court will, of course,
require the trial court to conform to constitutional mandates, but it may
likewise require it to follow procedures deemed desirable from the view-
point of sound judicial practice although in no wise commanded by
statute or by the Constitution."6 In a number of cases, we have made
62. Id. See, e.g., Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317 (D.C. 1977); Punch v.
United States, 377 A.2d 1353 (D.C. 1977).
63. The balance between the trial and appellate benches in the area of judicial discre-
tion has commanded the attention of many commentators who have offered interesting
and elucidative analyses. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971); Carrington, The Power of District
Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969); Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
64. See United States v. Washington, 328 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1974), rev'd, 431 U.S. 181
(1977), which is presently pending before the Court of Appeals on remand on the issue of
invoking supervisory jurisdiction.
65. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
66. See Key v. Doyle, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 280 (1977).
67. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
68. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973).
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clear the existence of our supervisory power and our willingness to use it
in appropriate circumstances.
69
While the limit of this power may be, as yet, uncertain, 70 I, for one, am
convinced that this court has those supervisory powers which the highest
courts of the federal and state court systems possess, and that these
powers enable the court to develop standards for the administration of
justice in all the phases of the jurisdiction of the courts of the District of
Columbia. It is my firm belief that this court cannot and will not shirk its
responsibility to the public in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
What of the future? In the final analysis, combining in one appellate
court both the "institutional review" function and the "error review"
function is unsound. 71 I submit that in the not too distant future, our city
must face up to this fact and seriously consider the creation of a two-tier
appellate court system composed of an intermediate appellate court to
perform the "error review" function, and a higher appellate court to
perform the "institutional review" function as well as those other func-
tions indigenous to highest appellate tribunals.
In conclusion, may I thank the Editors of the Catholic University Law
Review for instituting this review of the decisions of the highest court of
the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. By
doing so, they provide an invaluable service to the bench, the bar, and
most importantly, to the public.
69. See, e.g., Arrington v. United States, 382 A.2d 14 (D.C. 1978); Berryman v. United
States, 378 A.2d 1317 (D.C. 1977); In re D.M.R., 373 A.2d 235 (D.C. 1977); Wise v. United
States, 293 A.2d 869 (D.C. 1972).
70. See United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S.
909 (1976), further proceedings on remand, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431
U.S. 937, 97 S. Ct. 2647 (1977).
71. See COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 60.
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